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Investment Decisions in New Generation Cooperatives: 
A Case Study of Value Added Products (VAP) Cooperative in Alva, Oklahoma 
Introduction 
Within agricultural markets in the United States, new generation cooperatives are one of 
the most important new institutional innovations. In many states, relatively conservative 
agricultural producers are investing in relatively risky new generation cooperative ventures. The 
objective of this paper is to explain why some producers invest in the new generation 
cooperative investment and some do not. 
Throughout the United States, many traditional cooperatives are merging, forming joint 
ventures and coalitions, or struggling to survive while new generation cooperatives are 
increasing in size and number. Traditional cooperatives have struggled to acquire equity because 
cooperative ownership per se conveys no benefit. Benefits generally come only on the basis of 
patronage. Traditional cooperatives attempt to build equity out of the profit stream. Members 
receive a portion of their allocated profits in the form of stock. Generally, there is no secondary 
market for traditional cooperative stock which is redeemed at face value by the cooperative at 
some future date. 
New generation cooperatives attempt to solve the equity problems of traditional 
cooperatives by changing the property rights structure (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). New 
generation cooperatives have a more clearly defined membership policy (closed or well-defined), 
a secondary market for members￿ residual claims, patronage and residual claimant status 
restrictions, and an enforceable member pre-commitment mechanism. 
Oklahoma￿s first new generation cooperative Value Added Products (VAP) recently 
opened in Alva, Oklahoma. The cooperative produces frozen dough products and started 
operation in 2000. To encourage new generation cooperatives, the Oklahoma legislature passed      2
the ￿Oklahoma Agricultural Producer Credit Act￿ for Oklahoma agricultural producers who 
invest in Oklahoma agricultural processing or marketing ventures (68 O.S. Section 2357.25). 
This act allows producers/investors to claim an Oklahoma income tax credit of up to thirty 
percent of their investment in Oklahoma producer-owned agricultural processing cooperatives, 
ventures or marketing associations created and designed to develop and advance the production, 
processing, handling and marketing of agricultural commodities grown, made or manufactured in 
Oklahoma. Several other groups are organizing to form similar cooperatives in Oklahoma and 
throughout the United States. 
Investments in many closed cooperatives may have a high degree of risk. The risks 
associated with VAP Cooperative are a prominent consideration because this investment is a 
start-up enterprise, which currently only sells its product to a limited number of customers, and 
its product market (pizza dough) is in a highly competitive market. There is direct competition 
from many companies with far greater resources and experience. In addition, VAP Cooperative 
relies on a single product line and has a limited product distribution system. 
Greater understanding of the forces influencing new generation cooperative development 
could help existing cooperatives make changes to survive and facilitate the creation of new 
cooperatives. Determinants of the survival and stability of agricultural closed cooperatives are 
empirically tested and evaluated. 
The model we used in this paper is an extension of the previous theory of agricultural 
cooperatives by integrating investment theory, non-monetary benefits, and fairness into a theory 
of cooperative development. Both Staatz (1983) and Sexton (1986) have used cooperative game 
theory to study agricultural cooperatives. Sexton argued that most responses to the forces      3
inducing change involve the formation of coalitions
1 that frequently require financial 
investments and have the potential to create non-monetary benefits for members. New generation 
agricultural cooperatives are coalitions of agricultural producers. The theory of coalitions has 
been developed largely independently in the economics literature.  
The essential difference between this paper and previous studies is that it treats the 
decision to join a closed cooperative as an investment decision and suggests that non-monetary 
payoffs and investor￿s perception of fairness may influence investment decisions. Closed 
cooperative investments are considered within the context of a portfolio of investment choices a 
producer can make. A member of a closed cooperative receives specific rights (delivery rights) 
in return for his/her investment. These rights are often transferable and may change in value. 
Payoffs are based on the amount of investment and whether the delivery obligation has been met. 
The value of the delivery right is expected to be directly related to both the size of the monetary 
distributions to the members as well as the perceived non-monetary benefits created for 
members. 
I. The Model 
  For notational purposes, we need to define the variables used in our equations. Let 
) , , ( 1 A p p p K =  denotes for the vector prices of the assets.  ) , , ( 1 A x x x K = represents the assets 
or portfolio choices. The variable  ) , , ( 1 A R R R K = denotes for expected return on the portfolio 
choices 1, ￿, A  and  ) , , ( 1 A G G G K = represents the non-monetary benefits from portfolio x. The 
investor￿s expected return of portfolio x is denoted by  Rx W = ; f is a vector of the investors￿ 
perception of fairness for each asset  ) , , ( 1 A f f f K = , and  o W  represents initial level of wealth. 
                                                 
1 Coalitions in agricultural marketing systems are horizontal and/or vertical groups of individuals or firms within the 
agricultural marketing system for whom a new set of binding rules or contracts are formed.      4
) (⋅ U  is the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function which is enhanced with non-monetary 
benefits, risk, and a fairness component. 
The risks associated with cooperative investment as part of producers￿ portfolio are 
represented by variance of return on investment from the portfolio x. The variance of return from 
portfolio x is represented by  Vx x′ φ  where  0 < φ  is the risk-aversion parameter, and the 
investor￿s utility from portfolio x has mean µ and variance 
2 σ . Utility is a function of expected 
return on investment, the variance of return from the portfolio, perception of fairness, and non-
monetary benefits associated with that portfolio choice. Producers are hypothesized to maximize 
utility subject to a wealth constraint: 
) , , , ( max fx Gx Vx x Rx U
x
′ φ  
subject to  o W x p = ⋅  
and  0 ≥ x  
Suppose that we have observed a portfolio choice 
i x for  n i , , 1 K = , the rational investor will 
choose portfolio 
i x if and only if 
) , , , ( ) , , ’ , ( fx Gx Vx x Rx U fx Gx Vx x Rx U
i i i i i ′ ≥ φ φ  
for all portfolio x such that  x p x p
i i i ≥ . This expression tells us that given the expected return R, 
variance/covariance matrix V, non-monetary return vector G, and fairness vector f, investors 
decide to invest in the cooperative membership if the expected utility from a portfolio containing 
a cooperative investment exceeds any other affordable portfolio.      5
There are two ways of proving necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of the 
utility maximization model
2: Slutsky conditions and revealed preference conditions (Varian, 
1983). Revealed preference conditions are used because this approach is more applicable for 
empirical analysis. 
The Closed Cooperative Investment Model 
  The investor￿s interest is what the optimal value of 
i x is to achieve maximum utility and 
how the optimal utility changes as 
i x changes. Suppose that  F D and , , ,
2 σ µ are chosen to 
maximize investor￿s utility function. For each different value of 
i x there will typically be a 
different optimal choice of  F D and , , ,
2 σ µ . For example, a different amount of delivery rights 
purchased will determine different optimal choice of monetary and non-monetary benefits, risks, 
and perception of fairness. Let us denote the maximum utility as  ) (
i x M  for different choices of 
i x , and 
i Rx = µ ; 
i Gx D = ; 
i i Vx x ’
2 φ σ = ; 
i fx F = and  0 0) , ( W x p W x g
i i i − = ,  
() ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( max ) (
2 i i i i
x
i x F x x D x U x M
i σ µ ≡  
subject to  0 ) , ( 0 = W x g
i  and  0 ≥
i x  
by setting the Lagrangian function 
() ) , ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ) , ( 0
2 W x g x F x x D x U x L
i i i i i i λ σ µ λ − =  
and taking the first-order conditions with respect to 
i x and λ  then the closed cooperative 
investment function, 
(1)      ) , , , , , ( 0 W p f V G R x x




                                                 
2 The necessary and sufficient conditions for the mean-variance utility maximization of closed cooperative portfolio 
model are described in Puaha and Tilley (2002).      6
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses generated from our model provide the meaningful reasons why producers 
invest in closed cooperative investment: 
1 H : The producers who want to create employment opportunities and support economic 
development in their local community are more willing to invest in a cooperative as part of their 
portfolio if that investment provides those non-monetary benefits. 
2 H : The group of risk-averse producers is more willing to invest in a closed cooperative if they 
perceive that investment to have relatively low risk. 
3 H : The producers who are concerned about fairness are more willing to invest in a closed 
cooperative if that enterprise provides treatment that is perceived as fair. 
II.  The Survey Method and Factor Analysis 
The surveys were sent by mail to 712 members of Value Added Products Cooperative 
Association, a closed cooperative at Alva, Oklahoma and a random sample of Oklahoma wheat 
growers (members removed) who were non-members of VAP Cooperative. The survey 
instruments for the wheat producers were designed to allow for comparison of the results 
between the two samples of wheat producers.  The questionnaire was first mailed on January 28, 
2002. One week later, a thank you postcard was mailed to all respondents. On February 25, 2002 
the second mailing of the questionnaire was sent out to those who did not respond in the first 
mailing. Finally, those who still did not respond received a phone call requesting completion of 
the questionnaire. Some of the respondents who were called requested a third mailing. Responses 
from 298 respondents who did not invest and 323 respondents who did invest in VAP 
Cooperative were received.      7
The VAP Cooperative questionnaire starts with questions about the respondent￿s 
farmland location, the length of time they have operated a farm business, wheat production, farm 
acreage, land ownership, and some wheat marketing questions. A section focuses on the 
respondent￿s familiarity with VAP Cooperative and their method of learning about VAP 
Cooperative. Respondents were asked about their expected rate of return on their VAP 
investment compared to other debt or investment interest rates. Respondents indicate whether 
they are able to claim the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit as a result of their 
VAP investment or investments similar to VAP. Then, respondents indicate whether or not they 
have off-farm employment. Respondents were also asked to agree or disagree with several 
statements about whether perceptions of fairness, non-monetary benefits, tax credit, risk, 
marketing contract, and transferability of VAP￿s share affected their investment decision. The 
last part of questionnaire includes some questions on the respondents￿ demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, and education level. 
  The survey of wheat producers produces a complex set of raw data for testing the 
hypotheses of the proposed model. Raw data consist of several sets of scores of N observations. 
A correlation exists between sets of scores that can be measured by the correlation matrix 
produced. The sets of scores that are recorded from producers￿ attitudes toward the statements 
about VAP Cooperative investment decisions are grouped by their classification related to the 
variables in the model as follow: (1) items that measure fairness; (2) items that measure attitudes 
toward the marketing contract; (3) items that measure social benefits; (4) items that measure risk. 
In order to simplify a complex set of data, factor analysis was used. The central idea of 
factor analysis is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set that consists of a large number of 
interrelated variables, while retaining as much as possible of the variation present in the data set.      8
This is achieved by transforming the raw data to a new set of variables which are uncorrelated 
and ordered so that the first few factors retain most of the variation present in all of the original 
variables. 
  The methods of factor analysis used in this study are principal component and maximum 
likelihood factor analysis. Principal component analysis has simple algebra and computation 
techniques based on how the factors account for variance and explain correlations. The purpose 
of principal components analysis is to be able to estimate the correlation matrix, and this can be 
done by finding the characteristic equation of the matrix. This requires two sets of values, the 
characteristic vectors of the matrix or eigenvectors and the characteristic roots or eigenvalues
3. 
  Maximum likelihood factor analysis, as a method of condensation, is expected to search 
for factors. The strongest argument for choosing maximum likelihood factor analysis lies in the 
fact that it has statistical tests for the significance of each factor as it is extracted. 
The most critical element is whether a factor loading is significant or not, regardless of 
what method of condensation is used. Normally, a factor loading of 0.3 that indicates 9 percent 
of the variance is accounted for by the factor, is taken as a criterion to indicate that the loading is 
remarkable (Kline, 1994). This paper regards a factor as a remarkable loading if the loading is 
above 0.3. 
  Comparable data from members and non-members of VAP Cooperative were merged 
into one data set. The principal component analysis is performed by the FACTOR procedure in 
SAS. The output includes all the eigenvalues and the pattern matrix for eigenvalues greater than 
one. Given the sets of scores from producers￿ responses toward the statements about VAP 
                                                 
3 The eigenvector is a column of weights each applicable to one of the variables in the matrix. For example, if there 
are five variables there would be five weights in the first vector. The eigenvalue is the sum of squares of the factor 
loadings of each factor and reflects the proportion of variance explained by each factor. Thus, the larger the 
eigenvalue the more variance is explained by the factor.      9
Cooperative investment decisions, four social/non-monetary scores and five risk scores were 
available for analysis. 
Then the hypotheses testing using maximum likelihood method is performed to confirm 
the number of factors that should be retained. The combination of two methods in this factor 
analysis provides better results because the principal component analysis was first used to get a 
rough idea of the number of factors before doing the maximum-likelihood analysis. 
Using the factors generated from the factor analysis, then the model is estimated using a 
Tobit procedure that is appropriate for the censored dependent variable. The censored regression 
model in this study is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. This model has both 
discrete and continuous parts in its dependent variable (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Instead of 
observing the decision to invest in VAP Cooperative, the data on the amount of shares producers 
invested are observed. Thus, using the Tobit model the observed dependent variable is given by 











  N i , , 1 for K =  
where 
* I represents the amount of share units producers invested in the VAP Cooperative for 
those who joined the VAP Cooperative, and zero for those who did not join. 
  The estimated equation is: 
(3)
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
TAX WORK RATE SOCIAL RISK RISK
CONTRACT FAIR FAMILIAR YEAR DISTANCE I
ε α α α α α α
α α α α α α
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + =
12 11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
2 1
 
N i , , 1 for K =  
where  i DISTANCE  is the distance of respondent i￿s farm location from VAP Cooperative in 
miles.  i YEAR  is the number of years respondent i has farmed,  i FAMILIAR  is the variable for 
respondent i￿s awareness of the VAP Cooperative,  i FAIR  is the variable representing the      10
respondent￿s perception about fair treatment delivered by VAP Cooperative, i CONTRACT  is the 
variable representing the respondent￿s perception about VAP Cooperative marketing contract. 
i RISK1  and  i RISK2  are the first-two factors retained from the maximum likelihood 
factor analysis that represent the respondent￿s perception about risk on VAP Cooperative 
investment,  i SOCIAL  is the first factor retained from the maximum likelihood factor analysis 
that represents the respondent￿s perception that VAP Cooperative creates social/non-monetary 
benefits to investors,  i RATE  is the expected rate of return from VAP Cooperative investment for 
respondent i,  i WORK  is the dummy variable for off-farm employment,  i TAX  is the dummy 
variable for the Oklahoma Agricultural producer income tax credit, and  i ε is an independent 
identically distributed error term. 
III. The Results 
The VAP Cooperative Survey 
  Producer characteristics for those who invested and those who did not invest in VAP 
Cooperative are shown in Table I. Seventy-nine percent of the respondents that invested in VAP 
Cooperative were male while 96 percent were male that did not invest in VAP Cooperative. 
The mean farm acreage for VAP members was 1609.09 acres with 39 percent of those 
acres planted to wheat (620.67 acres) and non-VAP members having an average 1162.31 acres 
with 36 percent in wheat (422.86 acres). The VAP members produced an average of 18,015.68 
bushels in 2000 and 16,717.32 bushels in 2001 while non-VAP members produced an average of 
10,507.40 bushels in 2000 and 9,348.57 bushels in 2001.      11
Table I. General Descriptive Information about Respondents in Study 





















Average Age  56.86 years 58.16 years
Percentage of income from wheat  63.66 % 61.13 %
Averages: 
Farm acreage 
Acres of wheat 
Farmland was rented from others 
Wheat production in 2000 











Number of years farming: 
Average 
More than 5 years 








Familiarity with VAP Cooperative is measured on a one to five scale, with a one being 
not familiar through a five being highly familiar. Forty-three percent of producers that invested 
in VAP Cooperative were moderately familiar with VAP Cooperative while about 48 percent of 
non-VAP members were not familiar with VAP Cooperative (Table II). 
Table II. Percentage of Familiarity with Value Added Products Cooperative 




Not familiar  0.62 percent  47.50 percent 
Less than moderately familiar  7.17 percent  22.14 percent 
Moderately familiar  43.30 percent  21.07 percent 
Greater than moderately familiar  25.86 percent  5.36 percent 
Highly familiar  23.05 percent  3.93 percent 
      12
The members￿ share ownership is shown in Table III. Sixty-eight percent of VAP 
Member owned between 1,000 to 3,000 shares. About nineteen percent owned between 3,001 to 
5,000 shares. Producers that owned more than 20,000 shares were around 0.94 percent. 
Table III. The Percentage of VAP Cooperative￿s share ownership 




Between 1000 to 3000 shares  68.03 217 
Between 3001 to 5000 shares  19.12  61 
Between 5001 to 7000 shares  2.19  7 
Between 7001 to 10000 shares  6.27  20 
Between 10001 to 15000 shares  1.57  5 
Between 15001 to 20000 shares  1.88  6 
More than 20000 shares  0.94  3 
Minimum VAP Cooperative￿s share ownership is 1000 shares. 
Results related to producers￿ attitude toward VAP investment decisions are summarized 
in Table IV. Most VAP members indicated that VAP Cooperative creates non-monetary or social 
benefits. However, more than fifty percent of non-members did not indicate that VAP 
Cooperative creates non-monetary benefits (items a, b, f, and m, Table IV). Eighty-two percent 
of members and only 37 percent of non-members agreed that creating jobs in Alva is important 
for them. Fifty-four percent of members said that other people that they knew were investing in 
VAP. Seventy-three percent of investors said that they knew the people organizing VAP 
Cooperative, and 62 percent of them agreed that they would attend the VAP annual meetings. 
However, fifty-four percent of non-members stated that the other people that they knew were not 
investing. Sixty-one percent of them did not know the people organizing VAP, and around fifty-
one percent would not attend the VAP annual meetings if they were members. 
  When asked about fairness issues such as treatment of VAP to the investor, and 
distribution of patronage refund, more than 50 percent of members believed the VAP￿s treatment 
and its patronage distribution were fair (items e and n, Table IV).      13
Table IV. Members and Non-members￿ Attitude toward Statements about VAP Cooperative 
Investment Decisions 
VAP Members, in %  Non-Members, in %  Statements 
Disagree Uncertain Agree  Disagree  Uncertain  Agree 
a.  Creating jobs in Alva is important 
for me  10.53  7.89  81.58  28.99 34.30  36.71 
b.  Other people I know said they 
were investing in VAP  30.13  15.56  54.30 53.54  35.86 10.61 
c.  The business prospectus for VAP 
appeared logical  3.63  13.20  83.17  15.31  51.53  33.16 
d.  I could take advantage of the 30% 
Oklahoma Agricultural Producer 
income tax credit  6.56  7.54  85.90  16.84 38.78  44.39 
e.  Producers/investors in VAP will 
be treated fairly  3.64  27.15  69.21  8.21  62.56  29.23 
f.  The people organizing VAP were 
known to me  13.58  13.91  72.52 60.82  24.23 14.95 
g.  Shares in VAP can be bought and 
sold 23.51  33.11  43.38  12.76  72.45  14.80 
h.  The probability of patronage 
refunds would be high  9.60  33.77  56.62  18.46  67.18  14.36 
i.  VAP is a low-risk investment 
compared to investment in 
farmland   36.96  33.66 29.37 33.85  54.36  11.79 
j.  My other investments are low risk  41.39  23.84 34.77 48.47  15.31 36.22 
k.  The probability of VAP success 
was greater than 90%  15.89  40.07  44.04  30.41  62.89  6.70 
l.  Producers need to form 
cooperatives to increase their 
income 7.92  20.13  71.95  11.56 28.14  60.30 
m.  As an investor, I plan to attend the 
VAP annual meetings  8.94  29.47  61.59 51.31  42.93 5.76 
n.  The planned patronage distribution 
from VAP is fair  2.33  40.20  57.48  11.28  78.97  9.74 
o. Marketing/production  contracts 
are good for agriculture  6.60  17.82  75.58  11.62 33.84  54.55 
p.  Agric. Marketing coop are better if 
they have a marketing contract  4.32 26.91  68.77  11.73 35.71  52.55 
q.  Only agricultural producers are 
allowed to participate in the VAP 
Coop 12.87  17.82  69.31  14.80  54.08  31.12 
r.  Meeting wheat delivery 
requirements to VAP is relatively 
easy 1.66  7.28  91.06  19.80  63.96  16.24 
s.  Shares in VAP will appreciate in 
value 4.64  45.03  50.33  11.34  77.84  10.82 
Strongly disagree and disagree are combined. Agree and strongly agree are combined. 
  Both members and non-members did not have a problem with a marketing contracts 
(items o and p, Table IV).  The risks associated with VAP investment showed very interesting 
results. Thirty-seven percent of investors considered that VAP Cooperative was a risky      14
investment compared to an investment in farmland. Forty-one percent of members and over 
forty-eight percent of non-members thought that their other investments were high risk. A 
majority of non-members were not sure about the risk associated with VAP success in the future 
(items h, i, j, k and s, Table IV). 
Investors￿ agreement toward the statement about whether or not they are able to take 
advantage of the 30 percent Oklahoma agricultural producer income tax credit apparently 
supports the investment hypothesis, as may be seen in Table IV, item d. 
Maximum-Likelihood Factor Analysis 
  The eigenvalues indicate that one factor provides an adequate summary of the data. One 
component, with eigenvalue 2.2721, accounts for 57 percent of the total variance and two 
components explaining 75 percent of the variance, as may be seen in Table V. 
Table V. The Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix for Social/Non-monetary Benefits Factors 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
2.2721 1.5419 0.5680 0.5680 
0.7302  0.1938 0.1826 0.7506 
0.5364  0.0752 0.1341 0.8847 
0.4613   0.1153  1.0000 
 
The first factor is a measure of the overall social or non-monetary benefits factor since 
the first eigenvector shows approximately equal loadings and has large positive loadings on all 
variables (Table VI). The correlation with the variable MKW is especially high (0.81743). By 
taking the average of the squared loadings of the first factor, it explains 57 percent of the 
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Table VI. The First Factor Pattern for Social/Non-monetary Benefits Variables 
Variables Description  Factor1 
JOB  Creating jobs in Alva is important to me  0.77716 
PIV  People that I know also invest in VAP  0.65032 
MKW  VAP management are known to me  0.81743 
MTG  I will attend the VAP annual meetings  0.75961 
 
Figure 1 plots the size of investment as a function of investors￿ social perception 
measures. The size of investment appears to be positively related to perception about social/non-
monetary benefits. Higher social factor means more producers perceived that VAP Cooperative 
provides social/non-monetary benefits. 
  Figure 1: Investors￿ Perception about Social Benefits Measure by Size of Investment 
 
The analysis related to the risk associated with the VAP Cooperative investment shows  
that two factors provide an adequate summary of the complex sets of risk variables.       16
Cooperative Investment Decisions 
Using all measures of cooperative investment decisions, the evidence that perceptions 
about non-monetary/social benefits, risk associated with investment, and fairness affect 
producers￿ investment decisions were tested. The statistical analysis is restricted to producers￿ 
responses and perception scores available from the VAP Cooperative survey, resulting in a data 
set of 486 observations. 
 Accordingly,  the  LIFEREG procedure in SAS was used to estimate the model. The 
amount of shares of the producers￿ investment varies considerably, with a minimum value of 
1,000 shares and a maximum value of 100,000 shares. The mean producer investment is 3,589 
shares with a standard deviation of 6,851.8. Results in Table VII show that among the 
explanatory variables, the number of shares producers invested in VAP Cooperative is positively 
related to FAMILIAR and SOCIAL. The familiarity measure coefficient is positive and significant 
at the1 percent level. Producers who are familiar with VAP Cooperative are more likely to invest 
and invest more. The coefficient of the social and non-monetary benefits measure is also positive 
and significant at the 1 percent level. Clearly, the results suggest that VAP Cooperative should 
create the perception and the belief that the enterprise produces social benefits to investors. 
RISK2, which represents overall responses of producers that predominantly emphasizes on low-
financial risk over the expected monetary return (risk averse) from VAP Cooperative investment, 
has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 10 percent level.  Large potential investors, 
who are risk averse, perceive that VAP Cooperative is a risky investment and will have less 
willingness to invest in VAP Cooperative. 
The number of shares of investment are found to be negatively related to the distance 
from Alva (DISTANCE) and off-farm employment (WORK). The result suggests that the key to      17
success for VAP Cooperative investment will be determined dominantly by more full-time local 
agricultural producers￿ support. The farther their farmland from Alva, the less likely producers 
will invest in VAP Cooperative. Potential investors are also more likely to be full-time farmers. 
The distance from Alva (DISTANCE) and off-farm employment (WORK) are significant at the 
1 percent level and the 5 percent level, respectively. 
Producers￿ experience in farm business (YEAR) and marketing contracts (CONTRACT) 
had the predicted sign but showed no significant impact on VAP Cooperative investment 
decisions. Producers￿ years of farming is negatively related to the VAP Cooperative investment. 
The coefficient for CONTRACT is positive but not significant. 
Table VII. Parameter Estimate of the Cooperative Investment Decisions Using Censored 
Regression Model 
Dependent Variables  Lower  Left Censored Values  190 
  i I   Distribution Normal 
Number of Observations  486  Log Likelihood  -2985.546976 
Noncensored Values  296     
Independent Variables  Parameter Estimate Standard Errors
Constant -119.478 1982.426
DISTANCE** -9.1412 3.5079
YEAR  -20.6991 15.4161
FAMILIAR** 1525.417 244.2891
FAIRNESS  125.9939 238.9985
CONTRACT  41.5314 163.6396
RISK1 77.4709 198.3475
RISK2*  -407.616 246.7011
SOCIAL** 962.0520 245.4960
RATE  -6.3523 212.3705
WORK* -1072.84 528.4470
TAX*  518.5784 257.4294
** Significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level      18
Fairness perception (FAIRNESS), overall perception about risk associated with VAP 
Cooperative investment (RISK1), and expected rate of return (RATE) show predicted signs, but 
they are not significant. The agreement with the statement that investors can take advantage of 
the Oklahoma Agricultural Producer income tax credit (TAX) shows a positive effect on VAP 
Cooperative investment decisions. The income tax credit (TAX) is significant at the 5 percent 
level. Obviously, this result suggests that Oklahoma income tax credit had a positive impact on 
the VAP investment decision and encouraged the development of VAP. 
  From the results of the VAP Cooperative investment decisions, it is apparent that the 
investors bear risks due to changes in the relative business environments that directly affect the 
VAP Cooperative as a new enterprise. However, the vast majority of wheat producers in the 
Woods County area invested and became core investors in the VAP Cooperative. The empirical 
results give supporting evidence to explain this phenomenon. Regardless of the risks associated 
with VAP Cooperative investment, local agricultural producers in Woods County invested 
because they believe that VAP Cooperative generates social benefits for the local community. 
  Using censored regression procedures, the results show that investment provides 
social/non-monetary benefits at the 1 percent level.  Using the evidence from producers￿ 
response toward social benefits, this study finds that a closed cooperative can be initiated and 
will survive if there is significant support from local producers concerned about social/non-
monetary benefits. 
The Tobit results also found that willingness to invest in VAP Cooperative is less likely if 
an investor has a strong preference for low risk investments. Producers￿ responses clearly stated 
that the VAP Cooperative is not a low-risk investment. Risk-averse investors are not as willing to 
be investors.      19
There is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis about the impact of fairness on 
producers￿ willingness to invest. 
IV. Conclusions 
  The evidence examined in the previous section is, for the most part, consistent with the 
hypotheses developed in Section 1. The comparison of cooperative investment decisions between 
VAP members and non-members showed that more explicit positive perceptions are required to 
convince producers to invest.  Positive perceptions of local producers provided the support the 
VAP Cooperative needed to be developed.  And even though many local producers invested, the 
local producers clearly did not believe that VAP Cooperative was a low-risk investment as 
compared to investment in farmland. 
  A hypothesis test confirmed that social or non-monetary benefits have significant impacts 
on cooperative investment. The results suggest that a new generation cooperative needs strong 
support from local producers as core-investors to initiate and maintain cooperative as an 
operational business. Producers who are familiar with VAP Cooperative were more willing to 
invest in VAP Cooperative, and producers with farmland far away from Alva did not invest in 
VAP Cooperative. Strong preferences for low-risk investment lowered producers￿ willingness to 
invest in VAP Cooperative. With regards to farm-employment status, full-time farmers showed a 
greater intention to invest rather than part-time farmers.     20
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